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Abstract
This study investigates how well weekly Google search volumes track and predict bank failures
in the United States between 2007 and 2012, contributing to the expanding literature that
exploits internet data for the prediction of events. Different duration models with time-varying
covariates are estimated. Higher Google search volumes go hand in hand with higher failure
rates, and the coefficients for the Google volume growth index are highly significant. However,
Google’s predictive power quickly dissipates for future failure rates.
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1 Introduction
When US-Senator Chuck Schumer publicly questioned the financial health of the bank IndyMac
in the summer of 2008, the bank’s customers were quick to react. Within just three days, IndyMac
lost USD 100 million in deposits (Los Angeles Times, 2008); after thirteen days and withdrawals
amounting to USD 1.3 billion, the bank failed (Grind, 2012; Seabrook, 2008). These developments
were closely tracked by the Google search volume index; on the day of Schumer’s announcement,
the index value for the search term “IndyMac“ almost doubled, rising further up to 22-fold in
the following days. During the same period Washington Mutual, a struggling competitor, lost a
total of USD 9.4 billion due to a bank run, even surpassing IndyMac’s deposit loss. Contrary
to the much publicized IndyMac incident, the Washington Mutual run was largely unnoticed by
the media or the analysts (Grind, 2012). The run did not escape the Google search volumes and
Washington Mutuals share price, however: As in the IndyMac case, the search volume index for
“Washington Mutual“ more than doubled during the days of the run. The peak of the bank
run on Tuesday, July 14, 2008 coincided with the high search volume on that same day. Two
months later, Washington Mutual went through another bank run, with its peak on Thursday,
September 18. Again, Google index values track a total outflow of approximately USD 16.7 billion
between September 15 and September 24 (Office of Thrift Supervision, 2008).1 Search volumes
were surpassed only on September 25, 2008, the day when the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
(FDIC) walked into Washington Mutual’s offices and shut the bank down (see Figure 1).2
[Figure 1 about here.]
These two examples provide anecdotal evidence that Google search volumes can be a valuable
proxy to reflect public attention, which is generally hard to capture. It has been shown in a variety
of settings that Google can be instrumented to reflect such phenomena, from influenza epidemics
to unemployment forecasting (Ginsberg et al., 2008; Breyer et al., 2011; McCarthy, 2010; Bollen
et al., 2011). Whether it is useful for tracking developments in the banking industry is the subject
of this paper.
Contrary to, say, a newspaper article, internet search volumes reflect a much more crowd-
sourced and democratic approach. Users are actively looking for something rather than consuming
1Although there was extensive media coverage on the bank’s health before its closure, the public was informed
about the bank run only after the fact (Grind, 2012).
2The low index values occurring in regular intervals are typically weekend days - days when individuals spend
less time on their computers and bank transactions cannot be executed.
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information passively. While a newspaper article about a specific bank must be considered worth-
wile reporting in the first place and, in a second step, restricted to reflecting the facts, Google
search queries can capture a much wider set of information: facts as well as speculations, banking
experts as well as individual savers. Google queries also give an idea of how many individuals care
about a specific topic. Each search query is an uptick in the volume, translated into a rising index
value. In that sense, it is similar to trading volumes in financial markets (see also Mathiesen et al.
2013) - except that for the majority of the banks considered in this paper, such volumes do not
exist because many of them are not listed on a stock exchange. In the absence of share prices,
Google data may therefore prove to be a valuable source for understanding and predicting bank
failures. Providing real-time data on the popularity of a bank’s name on the internet on a weekly
basis, Google can help modelling short term dynamics by incorporating information that is not
fully captured in balance sheet positions or macro-level variables. Such information might be
important: The deposit withdrawal at Washington Mutual in July 2008 is what Iyer et al. (2013)
call a non-fundamental shock: a run that cannot be justified by the balance sheet fundamentals
of the bank itself or that couldn’t have already been justified at an earlier point in time. At the
time such a shock would have become visible in Washington Mutual’s balance sheet, the bank was
already under the reign of JP Morgan. Google tracked that non-fundamental shock in a timely
manner. Google data is also an interesting addition to fundamentals in light of the Iyer et al.
(2013) finding that large depositors tend to orient themselves to and act on (possibly non-public)
regulatory actions rather than fundamentals; Google might partly capture these movements.
Three main questions are tackled in this paper. Since Google data is not available for all banks
(discussed in section 3.1), a first question seeks to answer whether the availability of Google
data itself correlates with the survival of an individual bank. Second, given that Google data
is available, the question of how well the Google query shares track bank failures is examined.
Thirdly, I discuss the question of how indicative past changes in search volumes are when trying
to predict future failures.
To answer these questions, this paper looks at 433 bank failures and 400 surviving banks in the
United States in the period from January 2007 to March 2012, working with a dataset including
both Google data as well as balance sheet and revenue data on the level of an individual bank.
Using an exponential duration model with a piecewise-constant hazard rate and time-varying
covariates, I analyze how well Google search volumes in the United States track and predict these
bank failures. Results show that while the availabilty of Google data itself has no significant effect
on a bank’s survival, higher Google search volumes go hand in hand with higher hazard rates. As
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one moves further away from the failure date, Google’s predictive power dissipates.
The paper is structured as follows: in the following section, previous findings are discussed.
In the third section, the data is presented. In the fourth section, I model the failure rates of
individual banks, using weekly Google time series and balance sheet positions and revenue data
from the FDIC as explanatory variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
Working with Google data to model short-term developments has been successful before. From
influenza epidemics (Ginsberg et al., 2008) to tracking kidney stone incidences (Breyer et al., 2011)
and monitoring suicide risks (McCarthy, 2010), on to more economic applications in the field of
unemployment (Askitas and Zimmermann, 2009; D’Amuri and Marcucci, 2010; Choi, 2009; Tefft,
2011), inflation (Guzman, 2011), consumer behavior (Choi and Varian, 2012; Goel et al., 2010),
consumer sentiment (Radinsky et al., 2008; Della Penna and Huang, 2009; Preis et al., 2010) and
housing prices (McLaren and Shanbhogue, 2011; Wu and Brynjolfsson, 2013). Financial markets
have received some attention, too: Preis et al. (2013) quantified trading behavior using Google,
Bollen et al. (2011) predict stock market movements using Twitter, Mathiesen et al. (2013) likened
the statistical properties of Twitter data to the properties of trading volumes of stocks and Moat
et al. (2013) studied the correlation of Wikipedia page views and stock market movements. To
my knowledge, no paper to date has used Google search volumes to predict bank failures.
While there has been a variety of empirical work studying both wider banking panics as well as
individual bank failures, this literature has focussed on balance sheet positions and revenue data,
looking at issues of panics, contagion and information networks (for an overview, see Gorton and
Winton, 2003). Calomiris and Mason (2003) analyze bank failures in the 1920’s and 1930’s using
a duration model and data on individual banks as well as regional economic factors, disputing
the Friedman-Schwartz argument that many bank failures resulted from unwarranted panic and
finding evidence that most of the failures are justified by weak fundamentals. Saunders and
Wilson (1996) look at the role of bank contagion and information in the same period, using data
on deposit flows. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) make use of duration models to determine the
effect of managerial inefficiency on the probability of failure and acquisition. Whalen (1991)
assesses the usefulness of using proportional hazard models as early warning tool, concluding that
“reasonably accurate early warning models can be built and maintained at relatively low cost.“
Short term dynamics and irrational elements leading bank failures have proven difficult to
3
account for. Regarding bank runs on individual banks and micro-level withdrawal patterns, there
exists only a small literature. A recent one is Iyer and Puria (2012), which looks at the dynamics
of withdrawal patterns, deposit insurance and social networks in an Indian bank. A follow-up
study (Iyer et al., 2013) looks at how depositors monitor banks, finding that regulatory agencies
play an important role in the monitoring process. Other examples in the area of individual failures
and information networks include Kelly and O Grada (2000) or O Grada and White (2003).
From a macro perspective, Donaldson (1992) finds that there are periods when banking panics
are more likely to occur, but that exact starting dates of such panics are unpredictable. Gorton
(1988) offers empirical evidence compatible with the idea that when depositors receive information
forecasting a recession, they draw on their bank accounts, knowing that they will be dissaving
and anticipating the higher bank failure rate during recessions. I try to take such factors into
account by including macro-level variables.
3 Data Sources, Data Properties and Descriptive Statistics
As of December 2006, there were 8,681 active banks insured by the FDIC, compared to 7,357 at
the end of 2011. Within these five years, 433 FDIC-insured banks failed.3 In a first sample, I
include the 433 failed banks in the period from January 1, 2007 to March 31, 2012. In addition,
I randomly select a subset of 400 banks from the set of 7,357 active banks at the end of 2011
to include in the sample as control observations.4 Focussing on a random sample of surviving
banks instead of using the full sample is a result of the data collection procedure: As each query
on Google needs to be executed manually, collecting data on the whole set of surviving banks is
infeasible.
To restore adequate proportions between failures and survivors, I weight observations accord-
ingly when estimating the models (discussed in Section 4). To have an equal entering date for all
banks at risk of failure and to avoid complications when weighting observations (also discussed in
Section 4), 18 banks founded after January 1st, 2007 were dropped, of which 5 were failed banks.
For the resulting 815 banks, weekly Google search queries data and quarterly FDIC data was
downloaded. The sample period covers 273 weeks or 21 quarters.
3Note that aside from failures, there also were mergers as well as newly founded banks.
4None of these randomly selected banks were merged into other banks or failed up to the first quarter of 2012.
Sampling was done at the end of 2011 rather than at the end of the first quarter 2012 since data on the first quarter
of 2012 was only added at a later stage.
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3.1 Data Sources: Google Insights for Search
Weekly search query time series containing the bank’s name have been executed and downloaded
on “Google Insights for Search“ (Google, 2012), Google’s tool to analyze search volumes.5 These
time series reflect the query share of the bank’s name in the overall search traffic categorized as
“Finance“ on a weekly basis. The structure and properties of Google data deserves some extra
attention, as it has some non-standard restriction features.
The first restriction concerns the time horizon: Google time series go no further back than
January 1, 2004 (Choi and Varian, 2012). There is no data available before that date.
Second, Google only publishes relative numbers, not absolute search volume numbers. The
numbers are relative in two dimensions. First, the query share QSijut is the ratio of the number
of queries nijut for a given search term i and the total number of queries Njut in the selected
category j in geographic area u at time t :
QSijut =
nijut
Njut
, 0 ≤ QSijut ≤ 1
The second dimension concerns the time series of the query share itself. All query shares are
reported relative to the maximum query share MijuS in the selected period S multiplied by 100,
which gives the Google index value GIijut:
GIijut =
QSijut
MijuS
× 100,
with MijuS = max
t∈S
QSijut, 0 ≤ GIijut ≤ 100
GIijut is the number published by Google; all other numbers are not published. Under the
assumption that internet usage is growing, a rising index value can always be interpreted as a rise
in popularity for the search term. This is not true for falling values, as it is enough for the search
term to be growing at a less than average rate in order for the index value to fall. Growth rates in
query shares from t to t+ 1 are preserved in the published relative numbers, whereas percentage
point differences are not. The levels of the index values are not comparable across banks. For
these reasons, only Google growth rates are used in this paper.
Third, queries are “broad matched“, meaning that queries such as “IndyMac bank run“ are
counted in the calculation of the query index for “IndyMac“, but not vice-versa. Entering less and
more general search terms increases the probability that unrelated searches are captured as well.
For example, a query with the search term “forecast“ may capture results related to forecasts of
5“Google Insights for Search“ has been renamed to “Google Trends“ in the meantime.
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economic indicators, election results or weather, whereas a query for “weather forecast tomorrow
Zurich“ is much more specific and unlikely to include unrelated queries.
Fourth and linked to the third restriction, Google series for more restrictive queries are more
likely not to be published at all. As mentioned above, Google publishes the index values only if
the absolute number of search queries exceeds an unknow threshold (Choi and Varian, 2012). This
has two consequences: First, it restricts the sample from 815 to 210 banks for which any Google
data is available. Second, within the remaining 210 banks, the absolute search volume might
temporarily fall under the threshold and a value of zero is published. Since the true index value
is greater than or equal to zero, using these time series can bias estimation results. Focusing only
on the complete cases with uncensored Google series, on the other hand, reduces the population
to 25 failing banks and 23 surviving banks.6
[Table 1 about here.]
Google data is retrieved for the period of January 4, 2004 to March 31, 2012. Time series are
on a weekly basis. Queries are restricted to the United States and to the “Finance“ category to
avoid counting unrelated queries in the index.7 Queries outside the United States are unlikely
to be related to the individual banks, while narrowing the geographic space to state levels would
have resulted in more censored time series. A similar logic applies to the categoric restriction to
“Finance“: With a broader definition, unrelated queries might be captured in the index, while a
narrower definition might exclude relevant queries or leads to censoring.
For each bank, there is a separate Google query containing the bank’s name as a search term.
For practical reasons, legal appendices such as FSB, NA, National Association or Company as
well as “The“ and “&“ in bank names have been dropped, as it is unlikely that individuals search
for their bank with legal appendices or include symbols such as “&“.8 Likewise, missing spaces
(such as in WashingtonFirst) have been inserted. As for the case of popular bank names, there are
three institutions named “First State Bank“, two “The First State Bank“, two “Premier Bank“,
two “Summit Bank“, two “The Park Avenue Bank“, two “Legacy Bank“, two “First National
Bank“, two “Citizens National Bank“ and two “Integrity Bank“ in the sample.9 In these cases,
6When calculating percentage changes for a Google series that was censored in the preceding period, the value
was set to missing.
7Google classifies queries into about 30 categories at the top level and about 250 categories at the second level
using a natural language classification engine (Choi and Varian, 2012).
8The exact names used for the queries are stored in the Search name variable - a missing value means that the
name has been used without any modification.
9Note that the “The“ in bank names was dropped when Google data was downloaded, i.e. effectively there are
five banks named “First State Bank“.
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identical Google query time series have to be used, as one cannot differentiate and assign unique
series to each institution.
3.2 Additional Data Sources
The second major data souce for this paper is the FDIC database (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 2011). The FDIC provides a large set of balance sheet positions, revenue figures and
other characteristics of individual banks, which a number of researchers have used for similar
estimations. For the purpose of this paper, 11 variables were selected and downloaded on the
bank level on a quarterly basis, the shortest time interval available. The variables can be broadly
classified in the categories capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity and other factors.
The selection of the variables was guided by the selections in previous research papers estimating
similar models (e.g. Cole and Gunther 1995; Calomiris and Mason 2003; Wheelock and Wilson
2000). In addition, an indicator variable for the FDIC insurance limit raise from USD 100’000 to
USD 250’000 on October 3, 2008 was defined. The FDIC dataset comprises 836 institutions.
Bloomberg serves as an additional data source from which weekly LIBOR and overnight in-
dexed swap (OIS) time series were downloaded. 2010 US Census data (United States Census
Bureau, 2010) was used to define urban area dummy variables on the US county level.
3.3 Variables and Summary Statistics
Information on bank failures is taken from the FDIC, which lists failures in its failed banks list.
The failure date is defined as the closing date that the FDIC lists on that same list. The FDIC
has some discretion when it comes to the exact date of the closing, and therefore to exploit the
weekend days to wind down a bank (i.e. when banks are closed), most of these closing dates are
on a Friday. For my purposes, this means I can aggregate these closing dates to a weekly measure
with little loss of information. The failure time is then defined as the week into which the closing
date falls. Table 2 lists the number of failures in a given year. As one can see from the table,
most of the failures occur in the years after 2006. With respect to survival analysis, there is little
information in the years 2004 to 2006 since there are almost no failures. In addition, these failures
are unlikely to be connected to the financial crises. I therefore dropped the years 2004 to 2006.10
[Table 2 about here.]
10I did run the analysis including these years as a robustness check, without any meaningful changes in the results.
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Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. Aside from the Google variable, several balance
sheet variables are listed, which can be roughly categorized into a capitalisation variable (capital),
asset quality variables (troubled assets, commercial real estate, residential real estate), earnings
(net income), liquidity (large CDs, insdep, securities) and miscellaneous factors (insider loans,
holding company, entering age, urban). A description of the variables can be found in Table
A1 in the appendix. The reported values in the table are averages over the period starting in
January 2007 to March 2012 or the respective failure date where in a first step, the average over
all periods is taken for each bank, and then the average is taken over all banks in the group (i.e.
failures/survivors). The upper third includes all banks, the middle third only banks where Google
data is available, and the bottom third only banks with uncensored Google series.
Even if averaged over time, survivors and failures differ in some of the variables, as can be seen
by the stars indicating a difference in the Wilcoxon rank-sum test at the one percent significance
level. Differences attenuate somewhat as one restricts the sample to banks having uncensored
Google series, which is the sample main results will be based on. The differences in capital ratio
or large cash deposits, for example, are not significant anymore. If you exclude the two largest
failures, Washington Mutual and IndyMac, from the sample, the difference in gross assets is not
significant anymore either. Surviving banks differ from their failing counterparts with respect to
troubled assets, net income, securities and age.
[Table 3 about here.]
In terms of changes in Google query shares during the last weeks prior to failure, other bank
failures resemble the pattern of Washington Mutual seen in the introduction. Figure 2 shows the
weekly mean of the growth rate of Google query shares for the names of the 25 failed banks with
uncensored Google series, compared to the corresponding means of the 23 surviving banks. To
calculate the value for the control group, control group values were averaged in the corresponding
week to failure for the failing bank. In a second step, these values were averaged over all failing
banks. Values for failing banks remain on a low level up to five weeks before failure. From then
on, there is a slight upward trend in rates, up to about one week before failure, when they spike
and remain high in the weeks of and after the failure. Shortly after the failure, rates drop sharply.
Meanwhile, changes in query shares for surviving banks stay constant.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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Figure 3 shows the quarterly means of different key balance sheet positions of failed banks in
the last quarters before failure, again contrasted by the same statistics for surviving banks (the
values were calculated analogously to the Google values above). Note that the horizontal axis
is measured in quarters as opposed to weeks in the graph before. One can see clear trends in
capital ratios and troubled assets ratios that start out at least one year before failure. Ratios
for large deposits and securities stay relatively constant over time, but show clear differences
across the failing and the surviving group. Comparing these graphs suggests that fundamentals
of failing banks deteriorate early, while surviving banks’ advantageous securities and large deposit
positions protect them when having to react to liquidity drains. Google search queries, on the
other hand, react when failure is imminent, correlating with the timing of failure rather than with
the probability of failure itself.
[Figure 3 about here.]
4 Model and Results
4.1 Model
I use a piecewise-constant exponential model to model bank failures, estimating the hazard rate
semi-parametrically. Using a piecewise-constant hazard as opposed to a parametric model such as
the exponential or Weibull has the advantage of modelling the baseline hazard semi-parametrically.
This is important as the baseline hazard, i.e. the hazard common to all banks, is likely to change
over time, especially during the financial crisis. To account for the changes in the hazard rate
over time and work with time-varying covariates, the dataset is split into 273 weekly episodes.
The baseline hazard is modelled using time dummies as well as macro-variables (the LOIS
spread). With respect to time dummies, three specifications will be used. The first involves
splitting the 2007 to 2012 into just two subperiods: one before and one after the raise of the
FDIC insurance limit from USD 100’000 to USD 250’000 in October 2008. This intervention
is mainly an intervention to prevent potential bank runs from depositors; whether the hazard
changes can be directly tested on the corresponding dummy variable for the intervention. A
second specification uses yearly time dummies, changing the baseline hazard every year. A third
specification uses quarterly dummies. As an alternative to the piecewise-constant hazard model
and as a robustness check, I also estimate a Cox proportional hazard model. Note that in this
case, the baseline hazard function is completely unspecified.
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In the piecewise-constant hazard model, the hazard rate is a step function specified as
θ(t,xit, zi,wt) = θ0(t)λ(xit, zi,wt)
= θ¯t exp(β
′xit + δ′zi + γ′wt)
= exp[log(θ¯t) + β
′xit + δ′zi + γ′wt]
= exp(λ˜t)
where θ¯t is the interval-specific baseline hazard common to all banks and λ(xit, zi,wt) is the bank-
specific hazard component in period t. xit is a vector including individual time-varying covariates,
zi contains individual time-constant covariates and wt contains common, time-varying elements
at time t. The interval-specific baseline hazard is equivalent to including a period-specific dummy
variables in the overall hazard.
In the case of two subperiods with xit = xi1 and wt = w1 if t < s and xit = xi2 and wt = w2
if t ≥ s , the corresponding survivor function is given by (see Jenkins, 2005)
S(t,xit, zi,wt) = [S0(s)]
λ˜1 [S0(t)]
λ˜2
[S0(s)]
λ˜2
= exp(−sλ˜1) exp
[
−(t− s)λ˜2
]
Note that Google data varies on a weekly basis, while balance sheet data varies only quarterly.
As mentioned in the data section, the sample consists of all banks that failed in the period
from January 2007 to March 2012, plus a random sample of surviving banks. While in the sample
of 815 banks, more than half of them fail within the roughly eight years covered, these failures
represent only about five percent of the whole bank population of 8,681 institutions in December
2006. This choice-based sampling therefore needs to be accounted for by weighting observations
accordingly (Lancaster, 1992). Individual likelihood contributions are weighted by P/Q, where P
represents the population fraction of failing institutions, and Q represents the sample fraction of
failing institutions (correspondingly, (1−P ) and (1−Q) are the weights for surviving institutions).
Accordingly, failing banks get a lower weight than surviving banks. I reported both the absolute
number of failures as well as the weighted failures in the result tables.
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4.2 Results
In this section, I seek to answer the three questions raised in the introduction. The empirical
hazard rate including all 815 banks is displayed in Figure 4. One can see that the hazard rate
varies with time, peaking after week 170, or at the beginning of 2010. The result tables are
split into five columns; the model in the first column is using Google as the only explanatory
variable. The second column shows results for a piecewise-constant hazard rate model with
two subperiods (pre- and post FDIC insurance limit raise), followed by the piecewise-constant
hazard models with yearly and quarterly dummies. The last column shows the results of the
Cox proportional hazards model. The bottom of the table specifies whether the Google data
availability variable (Dummy) or the Google growth variable for the percentage change from the
last period (Growth) was used. The table also lists the total number of banks, the absolute
number of failures, and the weighted number of failures (which is around five percent of the total
number of banks, as outlined in the previous section). Note that the majority of the explanatory
variables are roughly bounded between 0 and 100, as they are percentages of gross assets. The
tables report coefficients (as opposed to hazard ratios). A change in Xk changes the overall
hazard by ∂θ(t,Xt,Z,Wt)∂Xkt = θ(t,Xt,Z,Wt)βk or increases the hazard by 100(exp(βk) − 1) percent
(approximatly 100βk percent). A negative coefficient decreases the hazard accordingly.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Table 4 shows results using the Google dummy variable. The coefficient for the Google variable
is positive, but remains statistically insignificant in all five models - whether Google data is
available is not a significant predictor whether a bank fails or not. Capital has the anticipated,
large negative effect on the hazard rate. Troubled assets positions increase the hazard rate as
one would expect, while securities - which can serve as collateral when lending money - decrease
the hazard, as do large cash deposits. Interestingly, the coefficient for the variable insdep, the
interaction between the large deposits ratio and the FDIC insurance limit raise dummy, is positive,
implying a relatively higher hazard for banks with large deposits after the FDIC intervention. Note
that the coefficient on the FDIC intervention (the subperiod dummy) counteracts the effect with
a negative coefficient of about the same magnitude (not shown in the table). Finally, coefficients
on commercial real estate and urban are positive, while the coefficient for holding companies is
negative. The remaining effects are not statistically significant.
[Table 4 about here.]
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Table 5 presents the main results using only banks with uncensored Google series. Generally,
effects increase the more flexible the baseline hazard is specified, with the exception of the macro-
variable LOIS, whose effect is increasingly captured by the more flexible baseline hazard time
dummies as one moves from the left to the right of the table. Coefficients are in line with
expecations. In all specifications, the coefficient on the Google variable is significant, raising
the hazard rate between approximately 2.4 and 4.8 percent, which is roughly comparable to the
coefficient on troubled assets. Capital and securities have the largest effects, both reducing the
hazard rate. The interaction variable between large deposits and the FDIC insurance limit raise
still dampens the hazard-reducing effect of the introduction of the FDIC raise for banks with a
high percentage of large deposits. A possible interpretation may be that depositors with accounts
holding between USD 100’000 and USD 250’000 profited from the raise, but customers holding
deposits in excess of USD 250’000 might have interpreted the intervention as a warning sign.
Further, the more a bank was invested in residential real estate the lower its hazard, which may
be counterintuitive given the financial crisis has its roots in the real estate sector. Lastly, it should
be noted that the significant effect in assets is mainly driven by the failures of the three largest
banks; excluding them from the analysis leads to statistically insignificant coefficients on assets
(not shown in the table).
[Table 5 about here.]
The appendix further lists results including censored Google series in Table A9 as well as
results ignoring weighting. The coefficients confirm the results shown above. The coefficient
on the Google variable is attenuated towards zero when using censored Google series, which is
expected as falls in the Google Index are overstated in the censored case.
Table 6 presents results for forecasting where the contemporaneous Googleit growth variable
is replaced with variables that are lagged by two to five weeks or with growth rates spanning two
to five weeks. Again, the dataset containing only uncensored Google series is used. The control
variables remain the same, but the output table is restricted to the coefficients for Google variables
only. The top half presents specifications including lagged values of the Google variable from two
up to five weeks, with the last column including all lags. The size of the Google coefficient goes
toward zero and becomes statistically insignificant as one moves back in time. An exception is
the last column in the upper half including all lags, showing significant effects for the three weeks
before failure, confirming the pattern seen initially in Figure 2.
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In the bottom half of Table 6, the Google variable covers the accumulated growth rate over a
longer period, from a 2-week period up to a 5-week period. The results confirm the previous state-
ments: Results are mainly driven by the Google growth values in the week of the failure; adding
additional weeks and lengthening of the time period barely changes the estimated coefficients.
[Table 6 about here.]
5 Conclusion
Washington Mutual was still considered well capitalized shortly before its closure (Grind, 2012),
but the situation changed rapidly in mid-September. Within a few weeks, a well-capitalized bank
- which admittedly did have problems with its mortgages - had to be shut down, as closing the
bank was apparently the only option to stop the ongoing run on deposits. Once a bank run is
kicked off, a vicious feedback-loop is started and withdrawals spread like a virus. As the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) model shows, one ends up in an equilibrium where it becomes rational for
every agent to pull out their funds; even deposit insurance may prove ineffective at this point
(Iyer and Puria, 2012; Grind, 2012).
Such bank failures are hard to predict. Empirical research analyzing the survival and survival
time of banks by making use of their balance sheets provides insights, but these studies have
their limits when it comes to the timing of the failure. Other research focussing on single banks
helps understanding the dynamics during a bank run, but cannot explain when or why the bank
run occurred in the first place. Google data can provide additional insights and accuracy in this
field. As this study demonstrates, Google search volumes start rising up to two weeks before
failure, indicating increased attention on the internet for an individual bank. By capturing short
term dynamics that cannot be reflected in quarterly balance sheet and revenue data, Google
queries can be a valuable improvement to more traditional predictions, especially when it comes
to the timing of the failure. Compared to other instruments used to capture publicly available
information, Google has the advantage of being “democratically“ weighted rather than binary or
influenced by other variables, reflecting the spread of information more accurately. While it is
hard to know how many readers read a newspaper article, a rising Google index can always be
translated into more people being concerned.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that Google search queries have their limits, too. First
and foremost, one does not know what drives the spike in search queries or what actions follow
after the Google search, making any causal claims hard to defend. Whether a news article leads to
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the rising search volume or customers looking for their e-banking accounts is unknown. It would
be rash to equate a rising Google Index with a bank run. What this study shows is that it can
serve as a warning signal that failure is imminent. Still, the timing of spikes in search volumes
remains hard to predict. As one moves further away from the bank’s failure date by more than
three weeks, Google loses its predictive power.
One should also keep in mind Google data’s technical limitations. First, the data are censored.
Particularly small banks fail to pass the search volume threshold, which means that there is no
data available at all. Second, Google publishes only relative numbers, which allows for the use of
growth rates only. Third, Google is not the internet. Google may be a popular search engine, but
it does not track all activity on the web. Instead of a substitute, Google data should therefore be
seen as a supplement to balance sheet and revenue analysis.
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Tables
Table 1: Overview of Samples Used
Sample Observations Failing banks Surviving banks
Original sample 180’291 428 387
With Google series 45’835 115 95
With uncensored Google series 10’296 25 48
23
Table 2: Bank failures over time
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
No. of failures 3 0 0 3 25 140 157 92 16 436
The year 2012 covers only the first quarter of the year.
The years 2004, 2005, 2006 are excluded from the analysis.
Source: FDIC
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Full sample
Failures Survivors
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Google data dummy .269 - 0 1 0.245 - 0 1
Gross assets 1’518.531∗ 15’727.860 0 322’059.800 394.069∗ 1’088.604 3.220 12’585.320
(in USD millions)
Capital 7.502∗ 3.213 0 22.828 12.411∗ 6.076 0 77.759
Troubled assets 8.252∗ 5.293 0 42.943 3.364∗ 2.928 0.290 17.944
Net income -0.498∗ 0.333 -2.729 0.312 0.130∗ 0.286 -1.073 2.317
Securities 8.191∗ 6.634 0 40.711 21.743∗ 14.452 0 76.510
Large CDs 16.209 8.164 0 53.467 16.173 7.440 0 39.799
Insider 1.093 1.389 0 10.956 1.345 1.488 0 10.716
Holding Co. 0.702 - 0 1 .692 - 0 1
Entering age 35.665∗ 38.406 0.071 156.493 68.375∗ 43.438 0.186 170.012
Urban 0.341∗ - 0 1 0.437∗ - 0 1
Observations 428 387
With Google data
Failures Survivors
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Google growth rate 2.699∗ 2.331 -8.673 6.960 ∗1.632 2.515 -11.384 5.146
Google data dummy 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Gross assets 4’618.891∗ 30’184.530 40.085 322’059.800 727.244∗ 1’803.306 20.207 12’585.320
(in USD millions)
Capital 9.996∗ 2.502 5.522 22.828 11.976∗ 7.248 6.540 77.759
Troubled assets 10.265∗ 6.488 1.191 42.943 3.849∗ 3.417 0.420 17.944
Net income -0.619∗ 0.426 -2.729 0.057 0.155∗ 0.344 -0.613 2.317
Securities 11.212∗ 7.978 0 40.711 20.825∗ 14.152 0 73.761
Large CDs 20.869∗ 7.916 5.282 53.467 17.598∗ 7.744 0 39.799
Insider 1.124 1.639 0 10.956 1.321 1.214 0 4.966
Holding Co. 0.687 - 0 1 0.726 - 0 1
Entering age 38.656∗ 38.511 0.624 156.493 60.966∗ 46.139 1.572 144.471
Urban 0.304 - 0 1 0.474 - 0 1
Observations 115 95
Uncensored Google series only
Failures Survivors
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Google growth rate 1.313 1.396 -0.024 6.857 0.791 1.010 0.127 5.146
Google data dummy 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Gross assets 15’400.920∗ 64’138.350 60.974 322’059.800 405.449∗ 574.211 36.744 2’316.473
(in USD millions)
Capital 10.119 2.769 5.522 15.224 11.684 2.164 8.894 18.799
Troubled assets 9.868∗ 6.794 2.388 30.363 3.971∗ 2.852 0.878 11.329
Net income -0.718∗ 0.512 -2.729 -0.152 0.109∗ 0.225 -0.467 0.526
Securities 10.194∗ 6.784 1.575 28.671 20.281∗ 12.676 1.964 47.787
Large CDs 22.849 10.780 5.701 53.467 15.693 5.719 7.828 27.899
Insider 1.514 2.707 0 10.956 1.418 1.134 0 3.969
Holding Co. .560 - 0 1 .696 - 0 1
Entering age 28.636∗ 27.770 0.953 99.806 69.443∗ 47.741 3.773 143.411
Urban 0.360 - 0 1 0.609 - 0 1
Observations 25 23
Sources: Google Insights for Search, FDIC, Bloomberg, 2010 US Census.
1 Reported values are averaged by institution and cover the period from Jan 2007 to Mar 2012 or up to failure,
respectively.
2 An ∗ indicates that the Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic for a shift in the location parameter between the
two groups is significant at the one percent level.
3 The difference in gross assets in the lower third of the table (uncensored Google series only) is not signifcant
anymore if the two largest banks Washington Mutual and Indymac are excluded.
4 ComRE, ResRE and Insdep variables have been omitted.
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Table 4: Results on Survival and Google data availability
Google only PWC-FDIC PWC-yearly PWC-quarterly Cox PH
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Google 0.120 0.315 0.289 0.273 0.234
(0.157) (0.232) (0.234) (0.232) (0.236)
Capital - -0.470∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
Troubledassets - 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Netincome - 0.067 0.054 0.049 0.033
(0.047) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038)
Securities - -0.064∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
LargeCDs - -0.094∗∗ -0.093∗∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.091∗
(0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.041)
Insdep - 0.090∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.097∗ 0.089∗
(0.037) (0.030) (0.039) (0.041)
ComRE - 0.034∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0011)
ResRE - -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Insider - -0.047 -0.054 -0.055 -0.075
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.074)
Assets - 0.078 0.076 0.074 0.072
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Age - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Holding - -0.705∗∗ -0.703∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -0.664∗∗
(0.237) (0.241) (0.243) (0.248)
Urban - 0.436∗ 0.419∗ 0.427∗ 0.444∗
(0.191) (0.192) (0.190) (0.191)
LOIS - 0.180 0.054 -0.360 -
(0.497) (0.194) (0.380)
Piecewise constant haz. quarterly 2-period yearly quarterly -
Google Variable Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy
Observations 181’113 181’113 181’113 181’113 181’113
Subjects 818 818 818 818 818
Failures 428 428 428 428 428
Weighted failures 40.330 40.330 40.330 40.330 40.330
Log-pseudolikelihood -169.566 -33.191 -32.762 -31.821 -104.610
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to
100.
3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100.
4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis.
5 The Cox PH model uses the Breslow method for ties.
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Table 5: Main Results, uncensored Google series only
Google only PWC-FDIC PWC-yearly PWC-quarterly Cox PH
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Google 0.042∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010)
Capital - -0.506∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.625∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.090) (0.107) (0.160)
Troubledassets - 0.049† 0.059∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026)
Netincome - 0.083 0.072 -0.076 -0.050
(0.066) (0.069) (0.130) (0.130)
Securities - -0.248∗∗ -0.261∗∗ -0.317∗∗ -0.348∗∗
(0.086) (0.092) (0.119) (0.134)
LargeCDs - -0.342 -0.237 -1.453∗∗ -5.083∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.217) (0.517) (1.212)
Insdep - 0.413† 0.304 1.515∗∗ 5.155∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.219) (0.502) (1.204)
ComRE - -0.046 -0.055 -0.026 -0.027
(0.044) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
ResRE - -0.068∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.094∗ -0.113∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.037) (0.047)
Insider - 0.105 0.166 0.176 0.153
(0.140) (0.153) (0.133) (0.138)
Assets - 1.021∗ 1.102∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗
(0.436) (0.508) (0.240) (0.268)
Age - -0.025 -0.029† -0.030∗ -0.023†
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012)
Holding - 2.007∗ 2.147∗ 1.056 0.635
(0.940) (1.019) (0.787) (0.935)
Urban - 0.881 0.996 2.823∗∗ 2.976∗∗
(0.879) (1.018) (1.002) (1.028)
LOIS - 0.571∗ 0.322 0.126 -
(0.269) (0.807) (1.102)
Piecewise constant haz. quarterly 2-period yearly quarterly -
Google Variable %-change %-change %-change %-change %-change
Observations 10’296 10’296 10’296 10’296 10’296
Subjects 48 48 48 48 48
Failures 25 25 25 25 25
Weighted failures 2.367 2.367 2.367 2.367 2.367
Log-pseudolikelihood -8.249 1.517 1.653 2.863 2.366
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to
100.
3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100.
4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis.
5 The Cox PH model uses the Breslow method for ties.
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Table 6: Forecasting
Variable PWC PWC PWC PWC PWC
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
1-week lag - - - - 0.039∗∗∗
(0.011)
2-week lag .027 - - - 0.036∗∗
(0.019) (0.012)
3-week lag - 0.013 - - 0.038∗
(0.014) (0.019)
4-week lag - - -.006 - 0.023
(0.017) (0.021)
5-week lag - - - 0.007 0.018
(0.011) (0.013)
Piecewise constant haz. quarterly quarterly quarterly quarterly quarterly
Google Variable %-change %-change %-change %-change %-change
Observations 10’296 10’296 10’296 10’296 10’296
Subjects 48 48 48 48 48
Failures 25 25 25 25 25
Weighted failures 2.367 2.367 2.367 2.367 2.367
Log-pseudolikelihood 2.353 2.219 2.191 2.195 3.243
2-week period 0.025∗∗∗ - - -
(0.004)
3-week period - 0.021∗∗∗ - -
(0.003)
4-week period - - 0.022∗∗∗ -
(0.003)
5-week period - - - 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003)
Piecewise constant haz. quarterly quarterly quarterly quarterly
Google Variable %-change %-change %-change %-change
Observations 10’296 10’296 10’296 10’296
Subjects 48 48 48 48
Failures 25 25 25 25
Weighted failures 2.367 2.367 2.367 2.367
Log-pseudolikelihood 3.067 3.185 3.105 3.181
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to
100.
3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100.
4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis.
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F Appendix
Table A7: Description of Variables
Variable Variable Name Definition
Googledata Google Data Dummy variable indicating whether Google data
is available
Google growth Google Google growth rate
(weekly; rate covering 1 to 5 weeks)
Capital Capital Ratio of equity capital and
loan loss reserves to gross assets.
Troubled Assets Troubledassets Ratio of loans past due 90 days or more, nonaccrual
loans, and other real estate owned to gross assets
Net Income Netincome Ratio of net income to gross assets
Securities Securities Ratio of investment securities to gross assets
Large CDs LargeCDs Ratio of time deposits of USD 100’000 or more
to gross assets
Commercial Real ComRE Ratio of construction loans and loans secured by
Estate Loans multifamily, nonresidential, or farm real estate
to gross assets
Residential Real ResRE Ratio of loans secured by 1-4 family real estate
Estate Loans to gross assets
Insider Loans Insider Ratio of insider loans to gross assets
Gross assets Assets Logarithm of gross assets (USD thousands)
Entering age Age Age of the institution (years) when first entering
the dataset
Holding Company Holding Dummy variable to indicate whether the institution
belongs to a holding company
Urban Urban One for urban counties, zero otherwise
Insdep Insdep Interaction of insurance dummy and large
deposits ratio
LIBOR LIBOR 3 month London Interbank Offered Rate
OIS OIS 3 month Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS)
LOIS LOIS Difference between LIBOR and OIS as a measure
of health of the banking system
Insurance Insurance Dummy variable to indicate the raise of the FDIC
insurance limit in October 2008
Quarter 1-21 Dummies indicating quarter
Year 2008-2012 Dummies indicating year
Sources: Google Insights for Search, FDIC, Bloomberg, 2010 US Census.
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Table A8: Google Query Index Value Growth Rates
Google Growth Rate
Statistic 1 week 2 weeks 3 weeks 4 weeks 5 weeks
Observations 13’152 13’152 13’152 13’152 13’152
Mean 0.834 0.947 1.041 1.111 1.213
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard Deviation 13.635 15.164 16.035 16.569 16.938
Minimum -73.077 -76.000 -81.00 -82.000 -81.000
Maximum 200.000 316.667 455.556 455.556 455.556
Includes only uncensored observations.
Source: Google Insights for Search
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Table A9: Results including censored Google series
Google only PWC-FDIC PWC-yearly PWC-quarterly Cox PH
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Google 0.019∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Capital - -0.661∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.049) (0.055) (0.065)
Troubledassets - 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Netincome - -0.010 -0.007 0.010 -0.020
(0.046) (0.047) (0.052) (0.062)
Securities - -0.055∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.071∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
LargeCDs - -0.167 -0.143∗ -0.182 -0.123
(0.142) (0.072) (0.145) (0.161)
Insdep - 0.135 0.111 0.152 0.098
(0.144) (0.073) (0.147) (0.162)
ComRE - 0.040∗ 0.037∗ 0.034∗ 0.038∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
ResRE - -0.017 -0.021 -0.025 -0.027
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Insider - -0.163 -0.183 -0.206 -0.318†
(0.167) (0.171) (0.174) (0.181)
Assets - -0.040 -0.027∗ -0.045 -0.177
(0.135) (0.137) (0.145) (0.148)
Age - -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Holding - 0.471 0.431 0.480 0.506
(0.322) (0.333) (0.350) (0.353)
Urban - 0.963∗∗ 0.956∗∗ 1.012∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.332) (0.335) (0.330)
LOIS - 0.282 0.259 -0.358 -
(0.202) (0.332) (0.662)
Piecewise constant haz. quarterly 2-period yearly quarterly -
Google Variable %-change %-change %-change %-change %-change
Observations 42’659 42’659 42’659 42’659 42’659
Subjects 210 210 210 210 210
Failures 115 115 115 115 115
Weighted failures 10.354 10.354 10.354 10.354 10.354
Log-pseudolikelihood -33.154 -0.891 -0.702 -0.007 -7.816
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to
100.
3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100.
4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis.
5 The Cox PH model uses the Breslow method for ties.
31
Table A10: Unweighted Results, including uncensored Google series only
Google only PWC-FDIC PWC-yearly PWC-quarterly
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Google 0.038∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Capital - -0.423∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.095) (0.105)
Troubledassets - 0.043∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
Netincome - 0.121† 0.119 0.050
(0.071) (0.073) (0.095)
Securities - -0.179∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.270∗∗
(0.063) (0.066) (0.087)
LargeCDs - -0.232 -0.218 -1.266∗
(0.365) (0.244) (0.622)
Insdep - 0.277 0.263 1.314∗
(0.366) (0.242) (0.624)
ComRE - -0.049† -0.055∗ -0.047
(0.026) (0.027) (0.032)
ResRE - -0.054∗ -0.057∗ -0.080∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.031)
Insider - 0.052 0.118 0.097
(0.178) (0.177) (0.180)
Assets - 0.622∗ 0.706∗ 0.477†
(0.251) (0.277) (0.270)
Age - -0.011 -0.012 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Holding - 1.405∗ 1.458∗ 0.713
(0.701) (0.729) (0.713)
Urban - 0.770 0.885c 2.366∗
(0.728) (0.787) (0.928)
LOIS - 0.466 0.389 0.205
(0.368) (0.668) (0.883)
Piecewise constant haz. quarterly 2-period yearly quarterly
Google Variable %-change %-change %-change %-change
Observations 10’296 10’296 10’296 10’296
Subjects 48 48 48 48
Failures 25 25 25 25
Weighted failures 25 25 25 25
Log-pseudolikelihood -21.653 23.007 24.997 36.494
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to
100.
3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100.
4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis.
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